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Abstract. Classical logic predicts that everything (thus nothing useful
at all) follows from inconsistency. A paraconsistent logic is a logic where
an inconsistency does not lead to such an explosion, and since in practice
consistency is difficult to achieve there are many potential applications
of paraconsistent logics in knowledge-based systems, logical semantics of
natural language, etc. Higher order logics have the advantages of being
expressive and with several automated theorem provers available. Also
the type system can be helpful. We present a concise description of a
paraconsistent higher order logic with countable infinite indeterminacy,
where each basic formula can get its own indeterminate truth value (or
as we prefer: truth code). The meaning of the logical operators is new
and rather different from traditional many-valued logics as well as from
logics based on bilattices. The adequacy of the logic is examined by a case
study in the domain of medicine. Thus we try to build a bridge between
the HOL and MVL communities. A sequent calculus is proposed based
on recent work by Muskens.
Many non-classical logics are, at the propositional level, funny toys which work
quite good, but when one wants to extend them to higher levels to get a real
logic that would enable one to do mathematics or other more sophisticated
reasonings, sometimes dramatic troubles appear.
J.-Y. Be´ziau: The Future of Paraconsistent Logic
Logical Studies Online Journal 2 (1999) p. 7
⋆ Originally in the proceedings of PCL 2002, editors Hendrik Decker, Jørgen Villadsen,
Toshiharu Waragai (http://floc02.diku.dk/PCL/). Corrected.
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1 Introduction
Classical logic predicts that everything (thus nothing useful at all) follows from
inconsistency. A paraconsistent logic is a logic where an inconsistency does not
lead to such an explosion, and since in practice consistency is difficult to achieve
for substantial theories, paraconsistent logics have many applications in com-
puter science, artificial intelligence, formal linguistics, etc.
In a paraconsistent logic the meaning of some of the logical operators must
be different from classical logic in order to block the explosion, and since there
are many ways to change the meaning of these operators there are many dif-
ferent paraconsistent logics. We present a paraconsistent higher order logic ∇
based on the (simply) typed λ-calculus [18,4]. Although it is a generalization of
 Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic the meaning of the logical operators is new, but
with relations to logics based on bilattices [13,22,7,9,10,25].
One advantage of a higher order logic is that the logic is very expressive in the
sense that most mathematical structures, functions and relations are available
(for instance arithmetic). Another advantage is that there are several automated
theorem provers for classical higher order logic, e.g. HOL [24], Isabelle [33], and
it should be possible to modify these to our paraconsistent logic.
We are inspired by the notion of indeterminacy as discussed by Evans [19].
Even though the higher order logic ∇ is paraconsistent some of its extensions,
like ∇∆, are classical. We reuse the symbols ∇ and ∆ later for related purposes.
We also propose a sequent calculus for the paraconsistent higher order logic∇
based on the seminal work by Muskens [32]. In the sequent Θ ⊢ Γ we understand
Θ as a conjunction of a set of formulas and Γ as a disjunction of a set of formulas.
We use Θ  Γ as a shorthand for Θ,ω ⊢ Γ , where ω is an axiom which provides
countable infinite indeterminacy such that each basic formula can get its own
indeterminate truth value (or as we prefer: truth code).
As mentioned above higher order logic includes much, if not all, of ordinary
mathematics, and even though ∇ is paraconsistent we can use it for classical
mathematics by keeping the truth values determinate. Hence we shall not here
consider paraconsistent mathematics. Using the standard foundation of math-
ematics (axiomatic set theory) it is possible to show that ∇ is consistent (but
when we use the logic to build theories we might introduce inconsistencies).
The essential point is that the higher-order issues and many-valued issues
complement each other in the present framework:
– On the one hand we can view ∇ as a paraconsistent many-valued extension
of classical higher order logic.
– On the other hand we can view ∇ as a paraconsistent many-valued proposi-
tional logic with features from classical higher order logic.
First we introduce a case study in the domain of medicine and motivate our
definitions of the logical operators. Then we describe the syntax and semantics
of the typed λ-calculus and introduce the primitives of the paraconsistent higher
order logic ∇, in particular the modality and implications available. Finally we
present a sequent calculus for ∇ and the extensions ∇ω, ∇∆, ∇† and ∇‡.
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2 A Case Study
As a case study we consider a small knowledge base in the domain of medicine,
previously used in a very different logic programming setting [8]. Originally the
knowledge base was investigated by N. C. A. da Costa and V. S. Subrahmanian.
We extend the analysis developed by Villadsen [40].
Three experts in medicine provided information related to the diagnosis of
two diseases: disease-1 and disease-2. The information concerning John and Mary
can be paraphrased as follows:
— Expert I (a clinician):
Symptom-1 and symptom-2 together imply disease-1.
Symptom-1 and symptom-3 together imply disease-2.
Disease-1 and disease-2 exclude each other.
— Expert II (also a clinician):
Symptom-1 and symptom-4 together imply disease-1.
Symptom-3 implies disease-2 if symptom-1 is not present.
— Expert III (a pathologist):
Only John has symptom-1 and symptom-4.
Neither John nor Mary have symptom-2.
Both John and Mary have symptom-3.
Clearly the above information is classically inconsistent, since John both has
and doesn’t have disease-1 and disease-2. Hence from a straightforward formal-
ization in classical logic we would also infer that Mary both has and doesn’t have
disease-1 and disease-2, but the sensible result would be to infer just that Mary
has disease-1 and doesn’t have disease-2 since the inconsistency with respect to
John should not lead to inconsistency with respect to Mary.
Of course we could separate the information about John and Mary com-
pletely (in two separate knowledge bases), but we would still be able to infer
that John has, say, some other disease-3 (and doesn’t have disease-3). So we
think a paraconsistent logic is needed.
It would be preferable to remove the inconsistency, but that might not be
possible, either for theoretical reasons — what are the principles to be used
in order to revise the knowledge base? — or for practical reasons — how can
hundreds or thousands of evolving rules be kept consistent? Again we think a
paraconsistent logic is needed.
We would like to point out that we find the extensive literature on belief
revision and update as well as on knowledge engineering techniques a supplement
rather than an alternative to works on paraconsistency.
Higher order logic is not really needed for the case study — first order logic is
enough — but the purpose of the case study is mainly to illustrate the working of
the paraconsistency. Even though the standard foundation of mathematics, pure
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axiomatic set theory, can be stated in first order logic (even as a single axiom),
higher order logics have the advantages of being expressive and with several
automated theorem provers available. Also the type system can be helpful.
We now turn to the motivation of the logical operators, which are to be
defined using so-called key equalities. We return to the case study in section 6.
3 Overall Motivation
Classical logic has two truth values, namely • and ◦ (truth and falsehood), and
the designated truth value • yields the logical truths. We use the symbol ⊤ for
the truth value • and ⊥ for ◦ (later these symbols are seen as abbreviations for
specific formulas).
But classical logic cannot handle inconsistency since an explosion occurs.
In order to handle inconsistency we allow additional truth values and the first
question is:
1. How many additional values do we need?
It seems reasonable to consider countably infinitely many additional truth
values — one for each proper constant we might introduce in the theory for the
knowledge base. Each proper constant (a proposition, a property or a relation)
can be inconsistent “independently” of other proper constants. We are inspired
by the notion of indeterminacy as discussed by Evans [19]. Hence in addition
to the determinate truth values ∆ = {•, ◦} we also consider the indeterminate
truth values ∇ = {p, pp, ppp, . . .} to be used in case of inconsistencies. We refer
to the determinate and indeterminate truth values ∆ ∪ ∇ as the truth codes.
We can then use, say, (∆ ∪ ∇) \ {•} as substitutes for the natural numbers
ω = {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .}.
The second question is:
2. How are we going to define the connectives?
One way to proceed is as follows. First we want De Morgan laws to holds;
hence ϕ ∨ ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ). For implication we have the classically acceptable
ϕ → ψ ≡ ϕ ↔ ϕ ∧ ψ. For negation we propose to map • to ◦ and vice versa,
leaving the other values unchanged (after all, we want the double negation law
ϕ ↔ ¬¬ϕ to hold for all formulas ϕ). For conjunction we want the idempotent
law to hold and • should to be neutral, and ◦ is the default result. For biimpli-
cation we want reflexivity and • should to be neutral, ◦ should be negation, and
again ◦ is the default result. The universal quantification is defined using the
same principles as a kind of generalized conjunction and the existential quantifi-
cation follows from a generalized De Morgan law.
While it is true that ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ does not entail arbitrary ψ we do have that
¬ϕ entails ϕ → ψ, hence we do not have a relevant logic [1] in general (but
only for so-called first degree entailment). Our logic validates clear “fallacies of
relevance” like the one just noted, or like the inference from ϕ to ψ → ψ, but
these do not seem problematic for the applications discussed above.
A Paraconsistent Higher Order Logic 5
Our logic is a generalization of  Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic, with the
intermediate value duplicated many times and ordered such that none of the
copies of this value imply other ones, but it differs from  Lukasiewicz’s many-
valued logics as well as from logics based on bilattices [13,22,7,9,10,25] where
the third value means “neither true nor false” and the fourth value means “both
true and false” (and is designated as well).
4 Conjunction, Disjunction, and Negation
The motivation for our logical operators is to be found in the key equalities
shown to the right of the following semantic clauses (the basic semantic clause
and the clause [[⊤]] = • are omitted; further clauses are discussed later). Also
ϕ ⇔ ¬¬ϕ is considered to be a key equality as well.
[[¬ϕ]] =


• if [[ϕ]] = ◦ ⊤ ⇔ ¬⊥
◦ if [[ϕ]] = • ⊥ ⇔ ¬⊤
[[ϕ]] otherwise
[[ϕ ∧ ψ]] =


[[ϕ]] if [[ϕ]] = [[ψ]] ϕ ⇔ ϕ ∧ ϕ
[[ψ]] if [[ϕ]] = • ψ ⇔ ⊤∧ ψ
[[ϕ]] if [[ψ]] = • ϕ ⇔ ϕ ∧⊤
◦ otherwise
In the semantic clauses several cases may apply if and only if they agree on the
result. The semantic clauses work for classical logic and also for our logic.
We have the following standard abbreviations:
⊥ ≡ ¬⊤ ϕ ∨ ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∃υ.ϕ ≡ ¬∀υ.¬ϕ
The universal quantification ∀υ.ϕ will be introduced later (as a kind of general-
ized conjunction). A suitable abbreviation for ⊤ is also provided later.
In order to investigate finite truth table we first add just [[†]] = p as an
indeterminacy. We do not have ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. Unfortunately we do have that ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ
entails ψ ∨ ¬ψ (try with •, ◦ and p using the truth tables and use the fact that
any ϕ entails itself). The reason for this problem is that in a sense there is not
only a single indeterminacy, but a unique one for each basic formula.
However, in many situations only two indeterminacies are ever needed, corre-
sponding to the left and right hand side of the implication. Hence we add [[‡]] = pp
as the alternative indeterminacy.
∧ • ◦ p pp
• • ◦ p pp
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
p p ◦ p ◦
pp pp ◦ ◦ pp
∨ • ◦ p pp
• • • • •
◦ • ◦ p pp
p • p p •
pp • pp • pp
¬
• ◦
◦ •
p p
pp pp
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5 Implication, Biimplication, and Modality
As for conjunction and negation the motivation for the biimplication operator
↔ (and the implication operator → as defined later) is based on the few key
equalities shown to the right of the following semantic clauses.
[[ϕ↔ ψ]] =


• if [[ϕ]] = [[ψ]] ⊤ ⇔ ϕ↔ ϕ
[[ψ]] if [[ϕ]] = • ψ ⇔ ⊤↔ ψ
[[ϕ]] if [[ψ]] = • ϕ ⇔ ϕ↔ ⊤
[[¬ψ]] if [[ϕ]] = ◦ ¬ψ ⇔ ⊥↔ ψ
[[¬ϕ]] if [[ψ]] = ◦ ¬ϕ ⇔ ϕ↔ ⊥
◦ otherwise
As before several cases may apply if and only if they agree on the result and the
semantic clauses work for classical logic too.
The semantic clauses are an extension of the clauses for equality =:
[[ϕ = ψ]] =
{• if [[ϕ]] = [[ψ]]
◦ otherwise
We have the following abbreviations:
ϕ⇔ ψ ≡ ϕ = ψ ϕ⇒ ψ ≡ ϕ ⇔ ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ→ ψ ≡ ϕ ↔ ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ ≡ ϕ = ⊤
∼ϕ ≡ ¬ϕ
We could also have used (ϕ⇒ ψ)∧ (ψ ⇒ ϕ) for ϕ⇔ ψ (using = instead of⇔ in
the definition of ⇒). Besides, ⇔ binds very loosely, even more loosely than ↔.
⇔ • ◦ p pp
• • ◦ ◦ ◦
◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
p ◦ ◦ • ◦
pp ◦ ◦ ◦ •
⇒ • ◦ p pp
• • ◦ ◦ ◦
◦ • • • •
p • ◦ • ◦
pp • ◦ ◦ •

• •
◦ ◦
p ◦
pp ◦
↔ • ◦ p pp
• • ◦ p pp
◦ ◦ • p pp
p p p • ◦
pp pp pp ◦ •
→ • ◦ p pp
• • ◦ p pp
◦ • • • •
p • p • p
pp • pp pp •
∼
• ◦
◦ •
p •
pp •
We could try the following standard abbreviations:
ϕ
?→ ψ ≡ ¬ϕ ∨ ψ ϕ ?↔ ψ ≡ (ϕ ?→ ψ) ∧ (ψ ?→ ϕ)
But here we have neither ϕ
?→ ϕ nor ϕ ?↔ ϕ, since the diagonals differ from • at
indeterminacies.
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?↔ • ◦ p pp
• • ◦ p pp
◦ ◦ • p pp
p p p p •
pp pp pp • pp
?→ • ◦ p pp
• • ◦ p pp
◦ • • • •
p • p p •
pp • pp • pp
! • ◦ p pp
• • ◦ p pp
◦ ◦ • • •
p p • • •
pp pp • • •
 • ◦ p pp
• • ◦ p pp
◦ • • • •
p • • • •
pp • • • •
We instead use the following abbreviations:
ϕ ψ ≡ ∼ϕ ∨ ψ ϕ! ψ ≡ (ϕ ψ) ∧ (ψ  ϕ)
Although ϕ ψ does not entail ¬ψ  ¬ϕ, we do have ϕ! ϕ and ϕ ϕ, and
this implication is very useful as we shall see in a moment.
We also use the predicate ∆ for determinacy and ∇ for indeterminacy with
the abbreviations (note that ∆ and ∇ are used for predicates and for sets of
truth codes):
∆ϕ ≡ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ∇ϕ ≡ ¬∆ϕ
We now come to the central abbreviations based directly on the semantic clauses
above:
ϕ↔ ψ ≡ (ϕ = ψ  ⊤) ∧
(ϕ ψ) ∧
(ψ  ϕ) ∧
(¬ϕ ¬ψ) ∧
(¬ψ  ¬ϕ) ∧
(¬(ϕ = ψ) ∧ ∇ϕ ∧ ∇ψ  ⊥)
We could also use (ϕ! ψ) ∧ (¬ϕ! ¬ψ) ∧ (ϕ = ψ ∨∆ϕ ∨∆ψ) for ϕ↔ ψ.
6 A Case Study — Continued
We use the abbreviations:
ϕ ⊲ ψ ≡ ϕ→ ¬ψ ϕ ⊳⊲ψ ≡ (ϕ ⊲ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⊲ ϕ)
We could also have used ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ ∨ (ϕ = ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) for ϕ ⊳⊲ψ.
⊳⊲ • ◦ p pp
• ◦ • p pp
◦ • • • •
p p • • ◦
pp pp • ◦ •
⊲ • ◦ p pp
• ◦ • p pp
◦ • • • •
p p • • p
pp pp • pp •
We use the operator ⊳⊲ to express the “exclusion rule” of expert I. We use
the logical necessity modality operator  to express that the observations of
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expert III concerning symptoms are not — for the sake of simplicity — allowed
to be inconsistent. We also use the operator  in the “exclusion rule” of expert I;
we discuss some variants later. The operator  is a S5 modality [29].
A formalization is as follows with Di for disease-i, Si for symptom-i, J for
John and M for Mary:
S1x ∧ S2x → D1x S1x ∧ S3x → D2x (D1x ⊳⊲D2x)
S1x ∧ S4x → D1x ¬S1x ∧ S3x → D2x
S1J ¬S2J S3J S4J
¬S1M ¬S2M S3M ¬S4M
We refer to the conjunction of these formulas as ∐.
We now calculate the truth code for the knowledge base ∐. We do this by
splitting ∐ into ∐J (x = J in ∐) and ∐M (x = M in ∐) and using the truth
tables we get the following two intermediate tables that must then be combined.
D1J D2J ∐J ∐’J D1M D2M ∐M ∐’M
• • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ ◦
• ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦
• p ◦ p • p ◦ p
• pp ◦ pp • pp ◦ pp
◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ • • •
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
◦ p ◦ ◦ ◦ p p p
◦ pp ◦ ◦ ◦ pp pp pp
p • ◦ p p • ◦ p
p ◦ ◦ ◦ p ◦ ◦ ◦
p p p p p p p p
p pp ◦ ◦ p pp ◦ ◦
pp • ◦ pp pp • ◦ pp
pp ◦ ◦ ◦ pp ◦ ◦ ◦
pp p ◦ ◦ pp p ◦ ◦
pp pp pp pp pp pp pp pp
The columns ∐’J and ∐’M correspond to the situation where  is omitted from
the “exclusion rule” for expert I.
From the columns ∐J and ∐M we obtain:
∐  D1J ∐  ¬D1J ∐  ¬D1M ∐ 1 D1M
∐  D2J ∐  ¬D2J ∐  D2M ∐ 1 ¬D2M
We consider here just the details of the first result, namely ∐  D1J . For the
combination ∐ we first observe that both columns ∐J and ∐M have p and pp rows,
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so ∐ can be p and pp (∐ will never be • since ∐J is never •, cf. the truth table for
the conjunction operator ∧). We then observe that when ∐ is p then D1J is p and
using the truth table for the implication operator → we get • (the designated
truth value). Similarly for pp and hence we have ∐  D1J .
We find these results the best possible (given that the information is classi-
cally inconsistent) because the inconsistency with respect to John does not lead
to inconsistency with respect to Mary.
From the columns∐’J and ∐’M we see that if  is omitted from the “exclusion
rule” we would not be able to derive ¬D1J , ¬D1M or ¬D2J . Instead of ⊳⊲ we
could consider Sheffer’s stroke | (where ϕ|ψ is equivalent to ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)), but
(D1x |D2x) would not give any models — all rows are ◦ (the  is needed for
the same reason as in the ⊳⊲ case). However, (D1x ⊳⊲D2x ∨ D1x |D2x) is an
interesting combination where we can derive ¬D1J and ¬D2J , but not ¬D1M
since D1M = p and D2M = pp give pp (and also D1M = pp and D2M = p give p).
7 A Sequent Calculus
7.1 Preliminaries
We base the paraconsistent higher order logic∇ on the (simply) typed λ-calculus
[18] (see also [11], especially for the untyped λ-calculus and for the notion of
combinators which we use later).
Classical higher-order logic is often built from a very few primitives, say
equality = and the selection operator ı as in Q0 [4], but it does not seem like
we can avoid taking, say, negation, conjunction and universal quantification as
primitives for ∇. Also we prefer to extend the selection operator ı to the (global)
choice operator ε described later.
We use the following well-known abbreviations in order to replace negation
and conjunction by joint denial (also known as Sheffer’s stroke):
¬ϕ ≡ ϕ|ϕ ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ ¬(ϕ|ψ)
We also have a so-called indeterminacy generation operator ∂ as a primitive. We
use the following abbreviations:
ϕ ≡ ¬ϕ ϕ˙ ≡ ∂ϕ ϕ¨ ≡ ∂ϕ˙ . . .
The indeterminacy generation operator is injective and we can use it for the
natural numbers. We say much more about it later.
The truth tables in case of four truth codes are the following.
| • ◦ p pp
• ◦ • p pp
◦ • • • •
p p • p •
pp pp • • pp
= • ◦ p pp
• • ◦ ◦ ◦
◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
p ◦ ◦ • ◦
pp ◦ ◦ ◦ •
∂
• •
◦ p
p pp
pp ◦
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The truth table only displays equality = between formulas (the biimplication
operator ⇔), but it is applicable to any type. We have the abbreviation:
⊤ ≡ (λx.x) = (λx.x)
Here λx.x is the identity function in the λ-calculus (any type for x will do).
7.2 Syntax
The sets of types and terms (for each type τ) are:
T = o | T T | S Lτ = LγτLγ | λVα.Lβ | Cτ | Vτ
Here S is the set of sorts (empty in the propositional case, where the only basic
type is o for formulas), Cτ and Vτ are the sets of term constants and variables of
type τ (the set of variables must be countable infinite), and α, β, γ, τ ∈ T and
such that τ = αβ.
We often write τ1 . . . τmγ instead of the type τ1(. . . (τmγ)) and ϕψ1 . . . ψn
instead of the term ((ϕψ1) . . .)ψn. Note that the relational types are τ1 . . . τno
(also called predicates).
If we add a sort of individuals ι to the propositional higher order logic ∇
we obtain the higher order logic ∇ι (further sorts can be added, but for our
purposes they are not needed).
7.3 Semantics
A universe U is an indexed set of type universes Uτ 6= ∅ such that Uαβ ⊆ UUαβ .
The universe is full if ⊆ is replaced by =.
A basic interpretation I on a universe U is a function I :
⋃ Cτ → ⋃Uτ such
that Iκτ ∈ Uτ for κτ ∈ Cτ . Analogously, an assignment A on a universe U is a
function A :
⋃Vτ → ⋃Uτ such that Aυτ ∈ Uτ for υτ ∈ Vτ .
A model M ≡ 〈U, I〉 consists of a basic interpretation I on a universe U such
that for all assignments A on the universe U the interpretation [[·]]M,A : ⋃Lτ →⋃
Uτ has [[ϕτ ]]
M,A ∈ Uτ for all terms ϕτ ∈ Lτ , where (we use the λ-calculus in
the meta-language as well):
[[κ]] = Iκ
[[υ]] = Aυ
[[λυα. ϕβ ]] = λu. [[ϕ]]
A[υ 7→u]
[[ϕγτψγ ]] = [[ϕ]] [[ψ]]
For clarity we omit some types and parameters.
What we call just a model is also known as a general model, and a full model
is then a standard model. An arbitrary basic interpretation on a universe is
sometimes considered a very general model.
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7.4 Primitives
We use five primitive combinators of the following types (τ ∈ T ):
D ooo Joint denial — Sheffer’s stroke
Q ττo Equality
A (τo)o Universal quantification
C (τo)τ Global choice
V oo Indeterminacy generation
We have the following abbreviations (we omit the types):
ϕ|ψ ≡ Dϕψ ϕ = ψ ≡ Qϕψ ϕ˘ ≡ Qϕ
∀υ.ϕ ≡ A λυ.ϕ ϕ˜ ≡ Cϕ ευ.ϕ ≡ C λυ.ϕ ∂ϕ ≡ Vϕ
Only a few of these abbreviations need explanation. The (global) choice operator
ε chooses some value x for which ϕ is satisfied (x can be free in ϕ); if no such
value x exists then an arbitrary value is chosen (of the right type). The choice
is global in the sense that all choices are the same for equivalent ϕ’s, hence for
instance we have (εx.⊥) = (εx.⊥).
The notation ϕ˘ turns ϕ into a singleton set with itself as the sole member
and ϕ˜ is its inverse, since ˜˘ϕ = ϕ, which is called the selection property, cf. the
selection operator ı in Q0 [4]. But ϕ˜ is of course also defined for non-singleton
sets, namely as the (global) choice operator just described. We say a little more
about these matters when we come to the choice rules.
We can even eliminate the λ-notation if we use two additional primitive
combinators, the so-called S and K combinators of suitable types. For example,
the identity function λx.x is available as the abbreviation I ≡ SKK, cf. [11].
7.5 Structural Rules
In the sequent Θ ⊢ Γ we understand Θ as a conjunction of a set of formulas
and Γ as a disjunction of a set of formulas, and we have the usual rules for a
monotonic sequent calculus:
Θ,ϕ ⊢ Γ Θ ⊢ ϕ, Γ
Cut
Θ ⊢ Γ
Θ ⊢ Γ
Θ,ϕ ⊢ Γ
Θ ⊢ Γ
Θ ⊢ ϕ, Γ
Notice that ϕ ⊢ ϕ follows from these rules and the rules for equality below.
7.6 Fundamental Rules
We use the abbreviation:
ϕ
∀
= ψ ≡ (λpq. ∀x. px = qx)ϕψ
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We have the usual conversion and extensionality axioms of the λ-calculus:
(λυ.ϕ)ψ = ϕ[ψ/υ] ϕ
∀
= ψ ⊢ ϕ = ψ
Here ϕ[ψ/υ] means the substitution of ψ for the variable υ in ϕ (the notation
presupposes that ψ is substitutable for υ in ϕ). For later use we note that if the
notation for an arbitrary so-called eigen-variable π is used in place of ψ then it
must not occur free in other formulas in the given axiom/rule). Also ϕ[ψ] means
ϕ[ψ/υ] for an arbitrary variable υ with respect to the given axioms/rule.
We have the usual reflexivity and substitution axioms for equality:
ϕ = ϕ ϕ = ψ, θ[ϕ] ⊢ θ[ψ]
7.7 Logical Rules
Let Θ = {θ | θ ∈ Θ}. Negation is different from classical logic. We follow [32]
and add only the following rules:
Γ ⊢ Θ
Θ ⊢ Γ
Γ ⊢ Θ
Θ ⊢ Γ
Conjunction and universal quantification are straightforward:
ϕ, ψ ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ Θ,ϕ, ψ ⊢ Γ
Θ,ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ Γ
∀υ.ϕ ⊢ ϕ[ψ/υ] Θ ⊢ ϕ[π/υ], Γ
Θ ⊢ ∀υ.ϕ, Γ
Remember that the eigen-variable condition is built into the notation.
We also have to provide axioms for the negation and conjunction in case of
indeterminacy:
∇x  ¬x = x x 6= y ∧ ∇x ∧ ∇y  x|y
7.8 Choice Rules
We have the following choice axioms [18] corresponding to the Axiom of Choice
in axiomatic set theory:
pυ  pp˜
Notice that due to the use of  we can only make a choice if ∃υ.(pυ). If we
used a different implication the choice might not be possible at all.
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7.9 Generation Rules
We use the following abbreviations:
∞ ≡ ⊤ 0 ≡ ⊥ 1 ≡ 0˙ 2 ≡ 1˙ 3 ≡ 2˙ . . .
N ≡ λx. x 6= ∞ T ≡ λx.⊤ ∅ ≡ λx.⊥
We have the following important axioms:
x˙ = y˙  x = y ∞˙ = ∞
p∞ ∧ p 0 ∧ (∀x. px  px˙)  py
The first axiom ensures the injective property and the second axiom makes the
third axiom, the induction principle, work as expected.
Hence 2 + 2 = 4 can be stated in ∇ (seeing + as a suitable abbreviation). It
can also be proved, but many other theorems of ordinary mathematics can not
be proved, of course (it does not contain arithmetic in general).
Since ϕ ⊢ ϕ we have among others 1 ⊢ 1, but this is just a curiosity.
7.10 Countable Infinite Indeterminacy
Let ω be the axiom:
(∇x ∇x˙) ∧ ∃y.∇y
No ambiguity is possible with respect to the use of ω for the set of natural
numbers, and the motivation is that the axiom ω introduces a countable infinite
type in ∇. The first part says that once indeterminate always indeterminate.
The second part of the axiom ω says that indeterminacy exists. In other words,
we can say that ω yields ∇-confinement and ∇-existence.
With the axiom ω we extend∇ to the indeterminacy theory∇ω (propositional
higher order logic with countable infinite indeterminacy) such that all theorems
of ordinary mathematics can be proved (the axioms can be shown consistent in
axiomatic set theory [31], which is the standard foundation of mathematics and
stronger than ∇ω, cf. the second Go¨del incompleteness theorem).
Although the propositional higher order logic ∇ is our starting point, the
indeterminacy theory ∇ω is going to be our most important formal system and
we use IT = {ϕ | ω ⊢ ϕ} as a shorthand for its theorems and Θ  Γ instead
of Θ,ω ⊢ Γ . In particular we previously used θ  ϕ in the case study (with the
conjunction of the formulas ∐ as the theory θ).
We allow a few more abbreviations:
ϕˆ ≡ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ ϕˇ ≡ ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ
We can now state the interesting property of ∇ω (coming from ∇) succinctly:
ϕˆ 1 ϕˇ
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7.11 Classical Logic
Let ∆ be the axiom:
∆x
The ∆ axiom is equivalent to ∇-non-existence, namely ∄x.∇x, and with the
axiom ∆ we extend ∇ to the classical propositional higher order logic ∇∆ which
was thoroughly investigated in [27,2].
Finally we can combine the extensions ∇∆ and ∇ι into the classical higher
order logic ∇ι∆, also known as Q0 based on the typed λ-calculus, and often seen
as a restriction of the transfinite type theory Q [3] by removing the transfinite
types. Q0 is implemented in several automated theorem provers with many active
users [24,33]. Classical second order logic, first order logic, elementary logic (first
order logic without functions and equality) and propositional logic can be seen
as restrictions of Q0.
In contrast to the paraconsistent ∇ω the classical ∇ι∆ is not a foundation of
mathematics, but we obtain the type theory Qσ0 by replacing the sort ι with the
sort σ and adding the relevant Peano postulates x˙ 6= 0 ∧ (x 6= y  x˙ 6= y˙) in
our notation, cf. [4, pp. 209/217] for the details.
7.12 Other Logics
In order to investigate finite truth tables, namely the three-valued and four-
valued logics discussed in previous sections, we have the following abbreviations:
† ≡ ⊥˙ ‡ ≡ ⊥¨
We get the four-valued logic ∇‡ by adding the following axiom to ∇:
∆x ∨ x = † ∨ x = ‡
Likewise we get the three-valued logic ∇† by adding the following axiom to ∇:
∆x ∨ x = †
But here ‡ = ⊥ due to the injection property of the indeterminacy generation.
8 Logical Semantics of Natural Language
A paramount application of higher order logic is natural language semantics,
in particular in the Montague grammar tradition of logical semantics [35,17],
where the grammar and meaning of natural language sentences are defined and
the logical consequences of the sentences must in the end be tested against
our intuition. A set of sentences provides a model of the world as observed by
a person or, more generally, an agent, and the agent is part of the world as
are other agents. In such cases it is important to be able to reason about the
knowledge, beliefs, assertions and other propositional attitudes of agents.
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We think that a robust treatment of propositional attitudes in natural lan-
guage is critical for many AI applications. We show in [39] how to obtain a para-
consistent logic for the propositional attitudes of agents while retaining classical
logic for the observer. The semantics of the natural language sentences can be
tested when used in arguments.
The sentences in the arguments below are ambiguous — depending on the
scope of the propositional attitude — but we have chosen examples where the
ambiguity does not effect the correctness. For example, the following argument
is correct in any case.
John believes that Victoria smiles and dances. √
John believes that Victoria smiles.
However, a paraconsistent logic is needed in order to handle the following incor-
rect argument.
John believes that Gloria smiles and doesn’t smile. ÷
John believes that Victoria dances.
These sentences and many other can be translated in a rather simple way into
formulas of the paraconsistent higher order logic ∇ω presented here with the
above correctness and incorrectness results [39]. We here outline the translation
for the following argument, which we consider to be incorrect although this is of
course debatable.
John believes that Gloria smiles and doesn’t smile. ÷
John believes that Victoria dances or doesn’t dance.
The translation is based on a categorial grammar, with a multi-dimensional type
theory as model theory and a sequent calculus as proof theory. We start with a
string, that is, a sequence of so-called tokens, obtained from the sentence in a
very simple way. For instance, the word order is not changed.
John believe Gloria smile and not smile stop
so John believe Victoria dance or not dance stop
From this string of tokens the categorial grammar provides the following formula
(the details of this rather complex translation can be found in [39]):
so
(λ⋆. stop⋆ λ⋆. believe⋆ (λ⋆. and’⋆ smile⋆ (not⋆ smile⋆) Gloria⋆) John⋆)
(λ⋆. stop⋆ λ⋆. believe⋆ (λ⋆. or’⋆ dance⋆ (not⋆ dance⋆) Victoria⋆) John⋆)
The formula contains lexical combinators and a single variable ⋆ ranging over
so-called situations (or indices) of type o. To avoid some parentheses we use the
convention that the variable ⋆ is always hung on to the preceding term.
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The tokens and the combinators are in one-to-many correspondence, which is
exemplified by primes ’ attached to conjunction and disjunction also available on
the sentence level without primes; the sentence level possibility is omitted here
for negation however. As a pleasant property we have that sentences embedded
in propositional attitudes are translated independently of the embedding.
The only entities needed for this example are agents (who can have proposi-
tional attitudes), but a richer ontology is of course possible still within type o (we
do not count indices as entities, since they are to be thought of as situations).
The lexicon for the present fragment of English has the following systematic
abbreviations (the notation© is a place-holder for the constructs listed after |).
so ≡ λpq. ∀i. pi→ qi
stop ≡ λ⋆p. ℓ⋆ ∧ p⋆
John Gloria Victoria ≡ λ⋆.© | J G V
know believe ≡ λ⋆px. ∀j.© ⋆xj → pj | K B
and or ≡ λ⋆ab. a© b | ∧ ∨
and’ or’ ≡ λ⋆tux. tx© ux | ∧ ∨
not ≡ λ⋆tx.¬tx
smile dance ≡ λ⋆x.© ⋆x | S D
Here the variables a, b, i, j, x have type o and p, q, t, u have type oo. The last
combinators are equal to S and D, respectively, but we find that the expanded
form emphasizes the pattern. Notice that we have chosen not to make names
dependent on the situation (hence we have the constants J , G and V for agents).
In order to obtain a paraconsistent logic for the propositional attitudes of
agents while retaining classical logic for the observer we introduce the following
“integrity” abbreviation ℓ of type oo (using the determinacy predicate ∆).
ℓ ≡ λ⋆. (∀xj.∆(K⋆xj)) ∧ (∀xj.∆(B⋆xj)) ∧ (∀x.∆(S⋆x)) ∧ (∀x.∆(D⋆x))
Besides the lexicon some postulates are needed. Knowledge implies belief, hence
we should add the postulate ∀ixj.Kixj → Bixj, and similar postulates yield
properties like introspection for knowledge and belief, cf. [39].
Using the abbreviations in the lexicon the formula given earlier reduces to:
∀i. (ℓi ∧ ∀j. BiJj → SjG ∧ ¬SjG)→ (ℓi ∧ ∀j. BiJj → DjV ∨ ¬DjV )
As required the formula does not hold in ∇ω. The details can be found in [39].
9 Conclusion
We have proposed a paraconsistent higher order logic ∇ω with countable infinite
indeterminacy and have described a case study in the domain of medicine as
well as an application in logical semantics of propositional attitudes.
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We have presented a sequent calculus for the paraconsistent logic ∇ and the
simple axiom ω turning ∇ into the many-valued logic ∇ω. Another axiom ∆
turns ∇ into the classical logic ∇∆. We would like to emphasize that it is not at
all obvious how to get from ∇∆ to ∇ when the usual axiomatics and semantics
of ∇∆ do not deal with the axiom ∆ separately as we do here.
Corresponding to the proof-theoretical ⊢ we have the model-theoretical 
based on the type universes, and we believe that soundness and completeness
results can be obtained (the latter with respect to general models of ∇ only).
In a way we try to build a bridge between the HOL and MVL communities.
We find both fields to be highly relevant to paraconsistent computational logic.
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